Suchergebnisse

We present a model for the strategic selection of party nominees, where competing groups choose their representatives based on the expected electoral returns. Technically, we look at a generalisation of the Hotelling-Downs model, where each nominee has a predefined position on the political spectrum and attracts the closest voters compared to all other representatives. Within this framework we explore the algorithmic properties of Nash equilibria, which are not guaranteed to exist even in two party competitions. We show that finding a Nash equilibrium is NP-complete for the general case. However, if there are only two competing parties, this can be achieved in linear time. The results readily extend to games with restricted positioning options for the players involved, such as facility location and Voronoi games.

Mobile phone has become an integral part of our lives. The penetration rate of mobile phones in the developing countries has increased abruptly and this is a good sign for the banking sector. Mobile banking is the most recently launched innovative feat in the banking sector. The unique ability of mobile banking to perform banking transactions irrespective of place and time has given a competitive edge over traditional banking. Even though, all circumstances are in favour of mobile banking, it has failed to take off in most of the developing countries. Hence, the main objective of the study is to find out the constructs which affect the adoption of mobile banking in India. A model has been proposed with the factors namely perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, self-efficacy, perceived risk, perceived enjoyment, relative advantage, compatibility, trust, social influence and personal innovativeness. The proposed model has been tested using various statistical analyses and the findings of this study reveal that relative advantage has the strongest relationship with the intention to use mobile banking.